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Britain and Europe. Thereafter it analyses the challenges that Brexit is likely to 
present for cooperation in public competition enforcement and suggests solutions 
for future development.
Résumé
Cet article examine les certaines conséquences de la sortie du Royaume-Uni de 
l’Union européenne sur l’application des règles de concurrence. Il se penche 
sur l’impact que Brexit va avoir sur les futurs litiges transnationaux en matière 
d’antitrust en Grande-Bretagne et en Europe. Puis, il analyse les défis que Brexit 
est susceptible de présenter pour la coopération dans l’application de la coopération 
publique et suggère des solutions pour le futur développement.
Key words: competition; litigation; Brussels Regulation; Brexit; cooperation
JEL: K21, K41
I. Introduction
Brexit represents an epochal change for both the United Kingdom and the 
European Union: the challenges that it brings to the UK are well known. How 
will the competences hitherto exercised by the Union be repatriated to London 
and, it is hoped, to the other nations of the UK, such as Scotland and Wales? 
How easy will it be for the British state to respond to the demands arising from 
the exercise of these powers? What will be the destiny of those areas of UK 
law that have so far developed in sync with EU law, such as competition law? 
In this particular area a number of further issues are going to arise both for 
the UK’s competition authority and for the UK courts: as the Competition and 
Markets Authority (hereinafter; CMA) exits from the European Competition 
Network (hereinafter: ECN), and regains full competence to deal with mergers 
having an impact on UK markets, strains on its operational capacities will be 
inevitable. Furthermore, with the commitment expressed numerous times by 
many ministers to develop a new national industrial strategy, the perspective 
that the EU Commission will lose its state aid powers vis-à-vis UK financial 
measures raises concerns of new protectionism and of the emergence of 
national champions.
The UK courts will also be at the forefront of the need to respond to the 
challenges brought by Brexit in the exercise of their jurisdictional powers: so 
far Section 60 of the UK Competition Act 1998 has guaranteed that British 
antitrust rules will be applied in a way that mirrors the Court of Justice of 
the EU’s interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is true that the 
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EU Withdrawal Bill, which is currently being scrutinised by the House of 
Lords, has indicated that the UK courts will have to take into account future 
EU case law. However, especially with the passage of years after the exit of 
the UK from the Union, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain 
‘synchronicity’ between Luxembourg and the judiciary sitting in a former 
member of the EU. No longer will the UK courts be able to access the Court 
of Justice of the EU via the preliminary reference procedure. In addition, the 
decisions of the same Court will no longer be binding on British judges, or 
indeed the UK authorities generally – one of the ‘red lines’ enumerated by 
the UK Prime Minister in many of her speeches.1
But how is this sea change going to work in reality? It is in fact admittedly 
difficult to imagine that well-established case law, which has so far been 
grounded in the EU acquis, will be reversed so neatly at the end of the transition 
period. It is therefore suggested that the UK courts are unlikely, come the 
exit of the UK from the EU, to depart from their established acquis without 
a very compelling reason (e.g. Fletcher, 2017). It may therefore be expected 
that, as they seek to reconcile the demands of their new ‘independence’ from 
Luxembourg, the British courts will remain subject to the Court of Justice’s 
‘soft power’, for the benefit of legal certainty. And last, but by no means least, 
as the Brussels Regulation2 ceases to apply vis-à-vis the courts sitting in Britain 
and Northern Ireland, litigants in transnational disputes, as competition law 
cases often are, are going to face significant uncertainty as to the applicable law 
and to the identification of the court having jurisdiction to hear their claims.
Brexit, however, is not just going to have a massive impact on competition 
law and policy in the UK. Its effects are inevitably going to be felt in the 
Union and in the development of the interpretation and enforcement of the 
competition rules by the EU Commission, its ECN partners and ultimately the 
Court of Justice of the EU. The aim of this paper is to offer some reflections 
on some of these issues by taking a deliberately EU focused standpoint. Having 
regard to the private enforcement of the competition rules, it will explore the 
challenges arising from the future inapplicability of the Brussels regime for 
EU-wide rules on jurisdiction and parallel proceedings. Could Brexit de facto 
reverse the allegedly unstoppable path that had led to the Brussels acquis by 
‘reviving’ earlier conventions and international agreements to which the UK had 
subscribed before 1972? Moreover, what consequences may the inapplicability 
1 See e.g. ‘The Government’s negotiating objectives for leaving the EU: PM Speech’ (the 
‘Lancaster House speech’), 17 January 2017, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.
2 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council No 1215/2012 of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2012] 
OJ L351/1.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
10 ARIANNA ANDREANGELI
of the Brussels Regulation vis-à-vis UK courts have in the field of competition 
law, where these courts had become a destination of choice for litigants?
Equally significant issues can arise in the area of public enforcement. With 
a ‘hard’ exit from the EU looming on the horizon, it is almost certain that the 
UK’s CMA will no longer be part to the ECN, according to the EU’s draft 
exit agreement with the UK. Yet, at the same time, the UK will be obliged 
to abide by the same principles of competition law that it subscribes to now, 
not only in the transitional period but also beyond March 2019. It is expected 
that the UK and the Union will negotiate cooperation arrangements akin to 
those in force between the EU and non-member states such as Switzerland, 
South Korea and Japan.
However, it is clear that they will be far less effective in terms of the depth 
of cooperation vis-à-vis the current ECN arrangements, thus potentially 
hindering the fact-finding and detection powers exercised by the Commission 
and the other ECN members in cases involving UK-based companies. So far, 
it looks as though the EU favours ‘off the shelf’ solutions to respond to the 
challenges presented by Brexit in a number of areas, and competition policy 
may make no exception to this approach. Yet, it is questionable whether the 
forms of cooperation that have so far characterised the relations of the EU 
with other jurisdictions may be appropriate, or indeed sufficient, to ensure 
the continuing detection of cartels that, despite political changes, are going to 
remain EU-wide. Could the UK’s exit from the EU therefore warrant a rethink 
of this approach? And what consequences could this have on the status quo 
as regards the forms of cooperation within and outside the Union? Could 
we envisage a situation whereby the UK competition authority, as a former 
member, can cooperate more closely with the remaining ECN members than 
other non-member states?
II.  Leaving the safe harbours of the Brussels Regulation: private 
enforcement in a post-Brexit world – is reviving old instruments 
a feasible option for multi-party, transnational competition claims?
We all know that one of the features of competition law disputes is to be 
multi-party and, in the EU context, to be also multi-national – impacting 
transnational trade, either actually or potentially, means that inevitably practices 
engaging the application of the EU antitrust rules are liable to fall within two 
or more different jurisdictions. Against this background it is beyond doubt that 
the availability of assured and reliable rules concerning the identification of 
a competent court is of capital importance for potential claimants. The Brussels 
Regulation has served precisely this purpose, namely to afford would-be 
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plaintiffs the possibility to assess and identify the forum within which to sue in 
accordance with a set of clear criteria which tend to be non-exclusive. Thus, in 
a competition damages action, a plaintiff may decide to rely on the ‘place of 
the domicile of the defendant’ rule; however, if she happens to be a consumer 
and considers that evidence may be available in the jurisdiction in which she is 
based, she may decide instead to rely on the rule that affords jurisdiction over 
the same dispute to the court where she herself has her place of residence.
Leaving aside the debate on the desirability of competition among different 
fora, which the Regulation engenders, it is beyond doubt that its rules have 
ensured legal certainty for claimants and defendants as well as, thanks to the 
interpretation of its rules prevailing in England, allowing English courts to 
become courts of choice for many plaintiffs (see generally Danov, Becker and 
Beaumont, 2013). Brexit, however, stands to change all of this; no longer will 
plaintiffs seeking to launch a claim before the much trusted and efficient UK 
courts be able to rely on the safe harbours of the binding rules enshrined in 
Articles 4 and 7 of the Brussels Regulation. Nor will the judgments handed 
down by these courts be binding across the whole of the Union. Claimants 
lodging actions in other Member States are unlikely to rest easy as parallel 
actions in UK courts will not be ruled out; in addition, those victorious in 
other Member States will no longer be able to enforce their judgments quickly 
and easily in UK courts and vice versa (see Dickinson, 2016; Andreangeli, 
2018, Ndolo and Liu, 2017).
It is acknowledged that these issues are encompassed in the agenda of the 
EU/UK negotiations and will therefore be given a resolution in that context. 
However, it is clear that the UK’s exit from the Union will herald uncertainty 
as to the identification of the competent judge and the risk of parallel actions. 
In particular, it is worth reflecting on whether, once the UK leaves the 
‘safe space’ of the Brussels regime, old international instruments of which 
the British state had been a signatory before its EU accession will ‘revive’ 
– could this ‘resurrection’ be compatible with current EU law principles? In 
addition, to what extent can the UK courts rely on domestic legal principles to 
decline jurisdiction before them that had been claimed in light of the Brussels 
Regulation? Although these courts will no longer be subjected to the principle 
of the supremacy of EU law, this question could be of capital importance for 
multi-party, multi-jurisdictional disputes where it may be more convenient for 
the parties, especially for the purpose of access to evidence and to justice, to 
petition British judges.
Before we examine the above issues, however, it is necessary to pause and 
consider why they are of particular importance not just for UK judges and lawyers, 
but also for EU competition law as a whole. As was anticipated, competition 
law disputes, especially those arising from the alleged infringement of Article 
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101 TFEU, are in nature multi-party and multi-jurisdictional: unsurprisingly 
therefore, they are also subject to the application of the Union’s conflicts of 
laws rules. Furthermore, it is well known that UK judges, and especially the 
English courts, have become a destination of choice for many litigants – they 
are perceived as competent, relatively quick (albeit not cheap by any means) 
and accessible, both in terms of standing and as regards the rules on evidence 
(see Lianos, Davies and Nebbia, 2015; Wurmnest, 2016; Danov, 2016).
The regime enshrined in the Brussels Regulation has been critical to the 
attainment of these outcomes, especially since the UK courts have been 
adopting a relatively extensive view of the jurisdictional rules. Cases like Provimi 
and Cooper Tyre have allowed non-UK plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction in 
the English courts on the sole ground that a member of the corporate group 
of one of the defendant companies had its domicile in England, and quite 
regardless of its direct involvement in the infringement.3 Although later case 
law, especially that handed down by the Competition Appeals Tribunal, aimed 
to lay down some boundaries to this rather sweeping reading of the standing 
rules, it is beyond doubt that the ‘plaintiff-friendly approach’ championed by 
these courts has promoted the standing of the UK as a good place to litigate 
competition claims. Where to, though, after Brexit?
It is sure that the UK’s exit from the Union will lead to it ‘regaining control’ 
on yet another area of policy, albeit, it is forecast, at a significant cost to 
the legal services industry. However, it is unlikely to change the nature of 
competition cases, the resulting likelihood of multi-jurisdictional claims that 
may impact the UK jurisdiction and the preference for UK courts, at least 
for a time. This is why it is argued that whatever solution is agreed, it must 
not depart from the current EU acquis and, in particular, must continue to 
ensure clarity as to the competent court and avoid unnecessary burdens when 
it comes to executing judgments obtained elsewhere in Europe.
However, it is unclear whether these issues are going to be a priority in the 
current negotiations, hence the question of how can the gap left open by the 
intervening inapplicability of the Brussels regime be filled. As was anticipated 
above, it has been mooted whether international agreements which the UK 
and the EU had been parties to before 1972 can become applicable again. And 
what about those Conventions that had been signed by the Member States, 
but have now been subsumed into the current EU private international law 
framework? Moreover, could the parties to a competition case seek to resolve 
these problems themselves by agreeing ad hoc arbitration clauses, designed to 
overcome the uncertainty arising from the intervening inapplicability of the 
Brussels Regulation? Or is all this just a lot of ‘scaremongering’ since courts 
3 Provimi Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA, [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm), para. 29, 30–34; 
also Cooper Tyre, [2009] EWHC (Comm) 269, para. 50; see also para. 55–56, 64.
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throughout Europe will continue to ‘trust’ each other, both in respect of the 
allocation of jurisdiction and the mutual recognition of judgments?
Coming to the first of these options, it may seem surprising but this has 
emerged in the debate as a feasible avenue to overcome the difficulties of 
a post-Brussels world. Among others, Dickinson argued in a recent article 
that come the exit from the Union, the UK would likely ‘revert’ to being 
bound, as a ‘stand-alone’ contracting state, to observe conventions such as, 
among others, the Lugano Convention concluded in 2007 that concerns 
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments, as well as the 1980 
Rome Convention or even the 1968 Brussels Convention (Dickinson, 2016).
It was suggested, in particular, that the 1980 Rome Convention could 
be a  ‘good candidate’ for testing this possibility, since it had been ‘open for 
signature by parties who (at that time) were members of the EEC’, as was 
the UK (Dickinson, 2016). Moreover, it was emphasised that the Convention 
remains in force to the extent that it binds also, inter alia, ‘overseas territories 
to which the EU’ would not extend. Perhaps more importantly, its application 
to a non-EU member state would not be affected by the fact that it was 
‘replaced by the Rome I Regulation’ for EU member states (Dickinson, 2016). 
On a similar vein, it has also been suggested that the 1968 Brussels Convention 
might again become applicable, since accession to it on the part of the UK was 
contingent upon EEC membership. It was also highlighted that the Convention 
itself has remained applicable to ‘relations with the territories of the member 
states to which (…) the EU Treaties’ do not apply (Dickinson, 2016).
There are, however, a number of objections to this scenario. It could be 
doubted in fact that the Court of Justice would allow these instruments to 
‘revive’ their effects vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. On this point, it should be 
remembered that the Court identified in the West Tankers case ‘the unification 
of the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and 
the free movement of decisions in those matters’ as the overriding objectives 
of the Brussels Regulation.4 Thus, the position of the Court could be 
interpreted as suggesting that the process leading to the enactment of the 
Regulation, which is aimed at ensuring the good functioning of the single 
market through establishing common, clear jurisdiction rules and allowing the 
‘free movement of judgments’, is irreversible in nature (Andreangeli, 2017). 
On this basis, it would accordingly be difficult to conclude that these ‘old’ 
international instruments could be in any way ‘revived’ vis-à-vis the UK. To 
hold otherwise would, in fact, run counter to the principle of effectiveness 
of EU law, and therefore create tension between, on the one hand, reasons 
of practicality in the resolution of multi-party and multi-jurisdictional cases, 
4 Case C-185/07, Allianz and another v West Tankers, EU: C: 2009: 69, para. 24.
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such as competition claims, and, on the other hand, one of the central tenets 
of Union law (Dickinson, 2016; Andreangeli, 2017).
Could the parties to an agreement, then, seek to minimise this uncertainty 
by signing ‘choice of court’ clauses designed to bring competition claims arising 
from, for instance, cross-jurisdiction joint venture agreements or distribution 
arrangements? It is well-known that these clauses have long been regarded 
by the Court of Justice as inimical to the key principles and objectives of the 
Brussels Regulation. In the aforementioned West Tankers preliminary ruling, 
the Court expressed the view that a court could not be prevented from ruling 
on its own jurisdiction, in accordance with the Brussels Regulation, by means 
of either an arbitration agreement or an injunction issued by another court 
on the basis of such an agreement.5 The Court was very clear that no court 
could determine the scope of the jurisdiction of another court because to hold 
otherwise would have undermined both the full effect of the Regulation and 
the ‘trust (…) that the Member States accord to one another’s legal systems 
and judicial institutions (…)’.6
Come Brexit, however, West Tankers will no longer be applicable to UK 
courts, which could therefore be able, at least in principle, to issue anti-suit 
injunctions in competition claims. However, it is not at all clear whether these 
injunctions will be upheld by a court of an EU member state for the latter 
would still be bound to follow the West Tankers dictum (Ndolo and Liu, 2017). 
To overcome this difficulty, it has therefore been suggested for, after exit, the 
UK to join the 2005 Hague Convention on choice of court, which itself allows 
the enforcement of choice-of-court agreements and to which any state can 
accede (Ruhl, 2018). It is acknowledged that this approach, to the extent that it 
relies on the will of the parties to remedy the uncertainty arising from a ‘hard 
Brexit’, and from an at least momentary lack of an ad hoc agreement, could 
go some way toward protecting the jurisdiction of a UK court in a competition 
case. Nonetheless, it is well known that the Hague Convention presents 
a number of structural limits, such as its strictly defined scope and the fact 
that so far it has not attracted the support that the EU had hoped for at the 
time of its negotiation. (Ruhl, 2018).
Can the mutual trust that the courts of the EU member states have 
developed over the years come to the aid of competition litigants wishing to 
lodge their claim ‘safely’ in the English courts or the Competition Appeals 
Tribunal? It has been argued that national courts are likely to recognise the 
jurisdiction of UK courts on the basis of the rules on ‘international lis pendens’, 
enshrined in Part 4 of the Brussels Regulation (Nyombi and Dickson, 2017). 
Admittedly, this approach would address the risks of uncertainty for litigants 
5 West Tankers, cit. (fn. 4), para. 29.
6 Id., para. 30.
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as well as remain consistent with the EU acquis. However, what remains 
unclear is whether domestic law in force in the UK, and in particular the 
English rule of forum non conveniens, may become applicable once again, thus 
leading to outcomes that are once again difficult to reconcile with the Brussels 
regime. (Nyombi and Dickson, 2017; also Allen and Overy, brief, 2016). It was 
mentioned earlier that Brexit is likely to allow the UK to ‘regain control’ over 
the jurisdiction of these courts in an area, such as antitrust law, where the 
latter had been interpreted in a generous and rather plaintiff-friendly manner. 
It could thus be argued, not without merit, that the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, which has been so far outlawed in cases falling within the scope of 
the Brussels Regulation,7 could be consistent with this objective, since it would 
allow English courts to decline the power to adjudicate on cases that can be 
justly tried elsewhere and quite regardless of the will of the parties (inter alia 
Andreangeli, 2018). Against this background, it may legitimately be doubted 
whether the mutual trust among national courts, that has so far accompanied 
EU membership, could be taken for granted in any way in a post-Brexit world 
without going as far as questioning, if not as putting under clear strain, those 
principles that have guided the allocation of jurisdiction in multi-party and 
multi-national competition claims (Merret, 2018).
In light of the above analysis, it may be concluded that the adjudication 
of multi-jurisdictional, multi-party disputes, such as competition cases, in 
a post-Brexit era is likely to create significant tension in the framework of 
principles that have so far guided the allocation of jurisdiction and the mutual 
recognition of judgments in the EU. It is acknowledged that many of these 
questions are likely to be subjected to negotiations, and will hopefully be 
settled as part of the exit deal between the UK and the EU. However, it is 
argued that until such time as this deal takes shape, litigants will be faced 
with great uncertainty and, more generally, a lot of the ‘established wisdom’ 
surrounding this area will be put to the test.
III.  Brexit and public competition enforcement: leaving the safe harbour 
of the ECN and sailing into uncertainty?
1.  Out of the European Competition Network – the new reality of cooperation 
without EU membership
The previous section highlighted some of the consequences of Brexit and 
argued that the exit from the Union will have significant consequence not 
7 See e.g. case C-68/93, Shevill, EU: C: 1995: 61, para. 35–37.
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only for the UK; it is also going to have an as yet unknown impact on key 
EU law principles, that have so far been fundamental for the effective private 
enforcement of the competition rules, namely those key tenets of EU conflicts 
of laws that have allowed antitrust litigation to flourish in Britain. The public 
enforcement of the competition rules is equally going to be no stranger to 
similar tensions. So far Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998, in accordance 
with principles of effectiveness and supremacy of EU law, has ensured that the 
rules governing the investigating powers enjoyed by the CMA are extended 
to give effect in the UK to decisions adopted by the EU Commission in the 
detection of infringements which have prima facie occurred within the UK 
jurisdiction, thus being critical to British competition agency’s fulfilment of its 
duties of cooperation within the European Competition Network.
Brexit is going to have a significant impact on this status quo. No longer 
will the infringement decisions adopted by the EU Commission be legally 
binding within the UK jurisdiction. In addition, and perhaps more critically, 
the CMA will no longer be subjected to its obligations and endowed with its 
powers as a member of the European Competition Network (see Cengiz, 
2012). In this specific respect, it is clear that the deep cooperation existing 
among the National Competition Authorities (hereinafter; NCAs) in the EU 
and between the NCAs and the Commission have allowed each member of 
the ECN to investigate far more efficiently prima facie infringements having 
an impact on interstate trade. The CMA itself recognises the importance of 
the Network and of the duties and powers of cooperation bestowed upon it 
by Council Regulation No 1/2003 for the fulfilment of its statutory duties.8
This all, however, stands to change dramatically since, according to the 
Draft Withdrawal agreement formulated by the EU, the British competition 
agency will no longer be a member of the ECN, thereby losing a host of 
investigative powers such as: the power of exchange and use in evidence 
documents gathered in the course of competition investigations and the power 
to ask other authorities to carry out inspections on its behalf. It is expected that 
this, among other issues, will be settled in the course of the exit negotiations. 
However, it is legitimate to doubt that whatever cooperation the UK secures 
vis-à-vis its erstwhile ECN partners, this cooperation will be as deep as the one 
that is available now to the CMA as a member of the Network. Additionally, 
addressing this issue as part of the exit negotiations is likely to be even more 
urgent since the EU aims to move to even greater cooperation among the 
NCAs and to reinforcing the authorities’ investigating and sanctioning powers 
8 See e.g. speech given by the CMA’s Chief Executive, Dr Andrea Coscelli, on 4 February 
2017, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/andrea-coscelli-on-the-cmas-role-
as-the-uk-exits-the-european-union (last accessed on 31 July 2018).
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through the EU Commission’s ‘ECN+’ Directive proposal.9 Arguably, this is 
not going to be just a problem for the UK: it is in fact submitted that Brexit 
is unlikely to change the integrated nature of the EU’s economy, within which 
the UK is a very significant player. Nor is it going to mean that transnational 
cartels involving UK based firms will be less likely in the future.
Against this background, it is argued that the circumstance that EU 
competition law may be applicable in an extra-territorial manner is indeed 
a tangible possibility. As is well known, the Court of Justice has accepted that 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the EU Merger Regulation can apply to practices 
involving companies based outside the Union. Just to name one notorious 
judgment – in the Dyestuffs appeal decision the Court held that even though 
the appellant company had at the time no seat within the common market, 
the Commission could still impose a fine on it with respect to an infringement 
committed by a subsidiary company, which the appellant – a company having 
its seat outside the EEC at the time – controlled totally on the ground that 
the breach had produced its effects within the Common Market.10 In other 
words, it is the place in which an agreement or other anti-competitive practice 
is implemented that matters for the purpose of triggering the jurisdiction of 
EU law, as well as the attending power of the EU Commission or of any other 
member of the ECN to investigate and sanction the infringers.11
In light of the above, it may be concluded that addressing the ‘vacuum’ 
arising from the CMA no longer being a member of the ECN is a key 
imperative for the EU just as much as for the UK. But how could this objective 
be achieved? Could proposing solutions that are ‘off-the-shelf’ be the only way 
of doing so? Or should the negotiating parties instead prefer a more creative 
approach to these issues, one that perhaps takes into account the fact that 
up to the moment of exit the UK has been compliant with the Union acquis? 
These questions will be addressed in the next subsection.
2.  From partners to… what exactly? Forging a new relation between the CMA 
and the (rest of the) ECN
The previous subsection highlighted some of the immediate consequences 
of Brexit for the position of the CMA vis-à-vis the European Competition 
 9 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council to empower the 
competition authorities of the member states to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market, 22 March 2017 COM(2017) 142 final, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/proposed_directive_en.pdf.
10 Case 45/69, ICI v Commission, EU: C: 1970: 73, para. 128; see also paras. 130–136 and 141.
11 See also, inter alia, case C-89/85, Re: Wood Pulp, EU:C:1998:447, para. 16–18.
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Network. It was argued that, as the UK’s exit from the EU is not going to 
affect the possibility for competition infringements to be cross-border, securing 
strong cooperation links between the UK and the rest of the Union is a priority 
not only for Britain but also for the EU as a whole.
The purpose of this subsection will be to consider the alternatives to the 
current model that may be deployed in a post-Brexit world to ensure the 
continued, seamless and Europe-wide application of the competition rules 
on the part of the CMA and ECN’s member agencies. It is well-known that 
in order to investigate and detect prima facie competition infringements, 
whose impact spans jurisdictions within and outside the EU, the Union has 
negotiated and concluded a number of cooperation arrangements with key 
partners. Such arrangements can, however, have different characteristics and 
focus on different elements of the investigating and sanctioning procedures; 
cooperation may be agreed to take place at the early stages of a case by, 
for instance, imposing on the parties an obligation to communicate to each 
other the start of a new investigation. Or it may entail the power and the 
corresponding duty to exchange information and evidence (e.g. Demedst, 
2012). In this specific context, this form of cooperation can once again be 
more or less extensive.
Having regard especially to antitrust cooperation in which the EU engages, 
existing instruments can be categorised in different ways. In the so-called 
‘first generation agreements’, the EU and its major trading partners, such as 
the US (1991), Canada (1993) and South Korea (2009), have undertaken to 
have a shared framework for the exchange of basic information concerning 
ongoing investigations. Within these frameworks, however, it is not possible to 
exchange information and documents gathered in the course of an individual 
investigation unless the parties to the investigation agree to such exchange 
(Demedst, 2012). In practice, therefore, only non-confidential information 
can be transmitted to another jurisdiction; the parties to first generation 
agreements are under no obligation to disregard their own domestic law, for 
instance by exchanging information that would have to remain confidential 
according to national rules (Demedst, 2012).
Upon perceiving these limitations, the EU Commission, taking stock also 
of the commitments made in 1998 by OECD members in a Recommendation 
concerning effective action against hardcore cartels12, took steps toward the 
negotiation of agreements entailing greater cooperation. ‘Second generation 
agreements’, therefore, allow the parties to cooperate more deeply among 
each other, by not only undertaking to communicate to each other information 
about new or ongoing cases, but also by being able to exchange evidence 
12 (1998), available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/recommendationconcerning 
effectiveactionagainsthardcorecartels.htm.
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gathered in the course of investigations, albeit within certain limits (Demedst, 
2012). So far, however, the EU has concluded only one second generation 
agreement with Switzerland.13 Incidentally, while in 1994 the US had put 
in place internal legislation aimed at allowing for similar instruments to 
be negotiated and concluded, no such agreement has been forthcoming 
(e.g. Newman and Delgado Echevarria, 2004). The EU/Swiss cooperation 
framework enables the parties to reciprocally exchange information gathered 
as evidence in competition investigations, albeit within strict limitations aimed 
at the protection of confidentiality; perhaps most importantly, the information 
exchanged under the agreement cannot be used in order to impose sanctions 
on individuals (Demedst, 2012).
Antitrust cooperation has also been possible thanks to other instruments; 
comprehensive mutual legal assistance treaties, for instance, have provided 
competition authorities with a tool to obtain assistance in competition cases, 
for instance for the purpose of obtaining evidence located in a different 
jurisdiction (Martinszyin, 2015; Joshua, 2008). Their use in antitrust 
investigations is however limited: unlike in many domestic jurisdictions, there 
is no EU-wide criminal offence for cartel behaviours, thus precluding the 
application of treaties aimed at ensuring cooperation with respect of criminal 
matters (Joshua, 2008). In addition, the forms through which this cooperation 
takes place are often cumbersome, since they usually involve the use of 
diplomatic channels or the involvement of judicial authorities (Joshua, 2008).
Competition provisions have also been included in free trade agreements 
(hereinafter; FTAs): thus, in the EU/South Korea free trade agreement, 
concluded in 2010, the parties reiterated their commitment to the existing 
competition cooperation agreement, concluded in 2009 and aimed at ensuring 
mutual cooperation, coordination and consultation as well as the exchange 
of non-confidential information. The FTA provided for an additional 
commitment of reciprocal consultation in matters of competition policy and 
to the exchange of non-confidential documents in those circumstances that 
were not covered by the 2009 agreement (Demedst, 2012). Similarly, the 2011 
Agreement between the EU and Columbia and Peru contains a number of 
provisions designed to facilitate cooperation and coordination in competition 
cases, the making of representations in cases of mutual concern and a limited 
exchange of information between jurisdictions (subject to the limits enshrined 
in domestic law as regards confidentiality) (Demedst, 2012).
It is added that the recent Canada-EU Trade Agreement (hereinafter; 
CETA), currently subject to ratification by national parliaments, reiterates 
13 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning 
cooperation on the application of their competition laws, (2014) OJ L347/3; EU Commission 
press release, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2245_en.htm.
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the importance of inter-agency cooperation and for that purpose confirms 
that such cooperation will continue to take place in the forms established by 
the 1999 Canada/EU Competition Cooperation agreement;14 this agreement15 
requires each party to notify the other party of the initiation of new cartel and 
abuse of dominance cases that may affect their interests.16 The Agreement 
also provides for a framework for exchange of information and legal assistance 
as well as for the mutual consultation as regards matters of mutual interest. 
These powers are, however, subject to significant limits: in accordance with the 
principle of comity, information can only be exchanged if it is in the interest 
of both parties and allowed by the respective domestic laws.17 Moreover, 
Article X(2) commits both parties to maintaining the confidentiality of any 
such information and imposes on each party the duty to oppose disclosure 
sought by a third party.
‘Soft’ forms of cooperation have also had a place in the EU’s policy aimed 
at securing greater coordination and assistance from competition agencies 
outside its jurisdiction. Memoranda of understanding, for instance, have 
been negotiated with several countries: unlike treaties, these are merely 
administrative arrangements that, in accordance with principles of negative and 
positive comity, deal with issues of ‘cooperation and coordination, assistance 
(…) and avoidance of conflict (…)’; they also lay out a basic mechanism for 
communication and rules on the confidentiality of the information reciprocally 
transmitted in the course of their application (Demedst, 2012). They are, 
however, entirely voluntary: thus, despite constituting flexile tools for the 
management of inter-agency cooperation, they do not create any obligations 
under international law, or indeed set aside any obligation enshrined in 
domestic law, most importantly those obligations concerning the confidentiality 
of information (Demesdt, 2012).
In light of the forgoing summary, it must be acknowledged that the ECN 
is not the only framework within which the Commission cooperates with 
competition agencies in other jurisdictions for the purpose of an effective 
detection and sanctioning of antitrust infringements. However, it certainly 
allows for very effective, almost seamless cooperation, as well as ensures that 
multiple proceedings concerning the same prima facie breach can be avoided 
(Cengiz, 2012). At its heart is the timely notification of new cases, avoidance 
of parallel actions and, at the same time, preference for joint actions should 
14 See Article 17.2, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and 
the EU, (2017) OJ L11/23.
15 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada 
regarding the application of their competition laws, (1999) OJ L175/50.
16 Article II.
17 Article VII.
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more than one authority be best placed to deal with a particular investigation; 
perhaps its most important feature is the possibility to both exchange and 
use in evidence material gathered in another jurisdiction and to carry out 
fact-finding measures on behalf of another authority.18 This is to take place 
in an informal, relatively flexible forum, where, on the one hand, there is no 
‘clearing house’ as regards case allocation but, on the other hand, extensive 
cooperation takes place, including the exchange and use as evidence of 
information gathered by other NCAs and the ability to request a partner 
agency to act as an investigating authority on behalf of the requesting party 
(e.g. Hjemtveldt, 2017).
Can other ‘off-the-shelf’ instruments be as effective as mechanisms for 
coordination and cooperation as the ECN? It is doubtful that ‘first generation 
agreements’ or competition cooperation provisions contained in FTAs may 
prove as effective; it is in fact submitted that under these arrangements the 
CMA and the EU Commission, for instance, would not be able to reciprocally 
exchange confidential information or indeed to carry out investigative measures 
on their reciprocal behalf with the same seamlessness as is the case under the 
current ECN structure (Demedst, 2012). As highlighted above when briefly 
discussing the Competition Chapter of the CETA, any cooperation between 
the EU Commission and a third country competition agency is very likely to 
be limited by the application of the principles of positive and negative comity, 
as well as by the continuing commitment to respect the confidentiality of the 
investigated parties.
It is equally difficult to imagine that mutual legal assistance treaties 
(MLATs) may replace the existing Network, not least because cartel behaviour 
is not criminalised in all of the Member States as well as in the EU, with 
the consequence that, the ‘double criminality’ requirement not being met, 
these treaties would not be applicable (Burnside and Crossley, 2005; Joshua, 
Camesasca and Jung, 2008). As for memoranda of understanding (MoUs), once 
again, limits concerning the protection of the confidentiality of information 
and the entirely voluntary nature of these arrangements are not going to be 
a suitable replacement as a means of regulating the future UK/EU relationship 
in the context of competition enforcement (Slot, 2015).
But what about second generation agreements? As was discussed earlier, 
the EU has so far negotiated one such agreement with Switzerland. This type 
of arrangement provides for deeper cooperation, for example by allowing the 
parties to reciprocally exchange information that can be used as evidence in 
circumstances equivalent to those listed in Article 12 of Council Regulation 
No 1/2003; the existing agreement also allows for reciprocal cooperation in the 
18 See EU Commission, Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities 
(‘the Network Notice’), (2004) OJ C101/43, especially para. 1 and 3.
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taking of evidence, again within the limits enshrined in the applicable national 
law (Slot, 2015). It could be suggested, not without merit, that an arrangement 
akin to the EU/Swiss agreement could replicate the key features of the ECN, 
by encompassing comparable cooperation and coordination prerogatives and, 
therefore, to ensure both the exchange of evidence and the carrying out of 
investigative measures by proxy.
On a closer look, however, this is not so straightforward. A new agreement 
of this kind is going to require time to negotiate and conclude: by way of 
example, it took the EU and the Swiss authorities nearly 3 years to negotiate 
the current arrangement, between 2011 and 2013, and the latter entered into 
force in 2014. Thus, even taking into account the transition period, time seems 
to be at least tight for the UK and the EU Commission to engage in talks aimed 
at undertaking similar cooperation rights and obligations (Wagner von Papp, 
2017). It is also not entirely clear whether a second-generation agreement 
could, in practice, secure all the benefits of the ECN: having regard, for 
instance, to the exchange of information and, in this context, to the protection 
of lawyer-client confidentiality, it bears reminding that UK lawyers will no 
longer benefit from the current EU safeguards, which are linked to the legal 
adviser being authorised to practice in one of the Union’s member states.19 
Thus, it could be argued that even under a second generation agreement, 
a UK-regulated lawyer would not be able to claim privilege against a request 
to disclose documents issued by the NCA of one of the EU member states. 
In addition, the consent of the parties to the case in question to the exchange 
of information may still be necessary: for instance, the EU/Swiss agreement 
requires such consent when evidence originating from a lawyer is required for 
transmission from Switzerland. The same applies vis-à-vis evidence provided 
as part of a leniency application or settlement process.20
Against this background, it is argued that in practice jeopardising 
cooperation in competition enforcement with one of the key NCAs in Europe 
will be an almost inevitable consequence of a hard Brexit. Is the negotiation of 
a new agreement, either as stand-alone or as part of the main treaty setting out 
the new trading relations between the EU and the UK the only way of creating 
a new framework for cooperation in this field? On a first look, a resounding 
‘yes’ may seem the only answer. The UK will be just like any other third state 
and will be treated as such. On reflection, however, the reply to this question 
is not so simple: it should be remembered that come its exit, the UK will not 
just be ‘another third state’. It will be a former member state, and as such its 
19 See case C-550/07 P, AKZO Nobel and others v Commission, EU: C: 2010: 512, para. 
40 ff.
20 See Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation, cit. (fn. 12), 
especially Article 7(5) and (6).
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internal laws will be compliant with the EU acquis. In addition, bearing in mind 
the text of the EU Withdrawal Bill21 and the stipulations made by the EU in its 
Draft agreement22, it is legitimate to expect that such consistency will remain 
for some time to come for a number of reasons. First of all, the UK courts 
will endeavour to take into account the judgments of the Court of Justice of 
the EU in cases where the application of ‘repatriated’ EU law is at stake.23 
Secondly, the UK will continue to be a party to international cooperation 
and consultation frameworks such as the International Competition Network 
and the OECD. Although it is acknowledged that these fora only provide 
space for ‘soft’ forms of collaboration, it is likely that, to the extent that they 
provide space for discussion of issues of mutual concern and for the exchange 
of best practices, they will help maintain convergence between the CMA and 
its erstwhile ECN patterns.
On this basis, would it perhaps be too bold to suggest that the negotiating 
parties could go beyond the ‘off-the-shelf’ solution of a ‘second generation’ 
cooperation agreement and undertake to maintain the status quo as regards 
the position and the relations existing between the CMA and the rest of the 
ECN? It is suggested that this is not a moot question, nor just a flippant 
proposal. It should be recalled that at the root of the tight relationship 
existing among the members of the ECN are a number of tenets, one of which 
is the recognition that the rights of defence enjoyed by the parties affected 
by competition investigation in each member state must be considered 
‘sufficiently equivalent’.24 It is further argued that Brexit will not mean the 
abrogation of the UK Competition Act 1998, or indeed of the UK’s domestic 
legislation safeguarding fundamental rights: if anything, the whole purpose of 
the UK Parliament enacting legislation designed to incorporate EU law into 
national law is to avoid the ‘cliff-edge’, namely the creation of any normative 
vacuum in areas where the EU retains competence until the UK exits the 
Union.25
21 See e.g. Article 6(2), Draft EU (Withdrawal) Bill, available at: https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0079/18079.pdf, especially para. 2 and 19 ff.
22 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Article 126 of the EU Draft Withdrawal Agreement, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-withdrawal-agreement-withdrawal-
united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-
energy-community_en.
23 Ibid.
24 See Recital 16, Preamble to Council Regulation No 1/2003, (2004) OJ L1/1.
25 See inter alia, Rt Hon David Davis MP, Speech given in Vienna on 20 February 2018, 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/david-davis-foundations-of-the-future-
economic-partnership-speech; also Explanatory Notes to the Bill, available at: https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0079/18079en.pdf.
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Against this background, it would be difficult to conclude that come the 
exit of Britain from the EU this equivalence will no longer exist. Accordingly, 
it is submitted that the CMA could still be considered a ‘trusted member’ of 
the ECN and, consequently, could be entitled to enjoy similar prerogatives 
as it is entitled to under Council Regulation No 1/2003 as the latter stands 
at the time in which the UK’s exit takes its full effect – namely, at the end of 
the transition period. The continuation of the existing relationship could be 
enshrined, perhaps, into a chapter of the future Withdrawal agreement and 
further complemented by a Memorandum of Understanding designing new 
practical arrangements underscoring the future CMA/ECN cooperation.
It is recognised that this is a very bold suggestion; it is also acknowledged 
that just as there are a number of normative justifications in support of it, 
so there are equally meritorious objections to it. As a result of Brexit, the 
UK will no longer be bound to the principle of supremacy of EU law26 and, 
perhaps more importantly, the Court of Justice of the EU will no longer have 
jurisdiction in the UK, especially via the preliminary reference procedure. 
In addition, it is unclear whether, should the proposed Directive aimed at 
enhancing the powers currently enjoyed by the ECN members be adopted and 
later transposed, the CMA may come to enjoy more extensive prerogatives 
than those enjoyed by the ECN members beyond the point of exit. Nonetheless, 
it is argued that, if the concern for both the British authorities and the EU 
negotiators is to avoid a ‘cliff-edge’ in the area of antitrust cooperation and 
to maintain the existing status quo, a modicum of pragmatism and trust, the 
latter supported by an expectation of continuing mutual consistency when it 
comes to, inter alia, the protection of the rights of defence of investigated 
parties, may be on order.
In conclusion, it cannot be denied that Brexit is going to be a challenging 
transition not just for the UK but also for the EU. While at first glance 
adopting ‘off-the-shelf’ options seems to be inevitable, such as second-
generation cooperation agreements, a closer look at the practical consequence 
of Britain’s exit from the Union could provide support for a tailor-made 
response to the question of how the relationship of the CMA with its 
erstwhile ECN partners should be fashioned and, in that context, for adopting 
arrangements that are as close as possible to existing forms and depth of 
cooperation. It is acknowledged that venturing down this road may put into 
question key principles of EU law, including the integrity of the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice. However, it is at least worth considering this option 
seriously, if the EU’s commitment to fighting transnational cartels is to 
remain a real one in a post-Brexit Europe.
26 See Explanatory Notes, cit. (fn. 24), para. 2, 53.
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IV.  Conclusions: Brexit and competition enforcement in Europe
– straining at the seams of EU law principles?
The exit of the UK from the EU has marked a seismic moment for the 
Union, first and foremost politically: even one of the drafters of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, admitted some time ago that Article 50 had 
been designed while taking the view that no member state, not least the UK, 
would have wanted to leave the EU (Gray, 2017). Competition enforcement, 
whether public or private, is not going to be immune to the aftershocks of this 
change. As illustrated so far, avoiding the ‘cliff-edge’ is not just an imperative 
for Britain but also for the EU. At the same time, however, it has been shown 
that attaining this objective does not come without a cost. If on the one hand 
it may seem appealing to ‘resurrect’ old conventions, so that some degree of 
continuity with existing EU conflicts of laws rules can be maintained, on the 
other hand, going down this route may be very difficult to reconcile with the 
integrity and inner coherence of the Brussels Regulation regime.
Furthermore, it remains partly unclear how the UK courts will be able to 
balance the demands and opportunities of their newly acquired ‘independence 
from Luxembourg’ against the need to maintain legal certainty, an objective 
likely to be best served by abiding by the ‘soft power’ of the Court of Justice 
of the EU (see e.g., Boffey, 2017). While it may be expected that the British 
judiciary will continue to adhere to EU precedent for some time to come (e.g. 
Lock, 2017), it is undeniable that this outcome presents significant institutional 
and legitimacy challenges, such as those stemming from the absence of 
a British ‘voice’ on the EU bench.
Having regard to public enforcement and to the position of the CMA 
vis-à-vis the ECN, mutual trust and the expectation that the rights of defence 
will be protected to a standard that is equivalent in the UK to that of the EU 
could support adopting a solution to how to refashion the relationship between 
EU competition agencies, including the Commission, and their UK counterpart 
– a solution that is not ‘off-the-shelf’ and can more or less replicate existing 
arrangements. However, it is doubtful whether effectiveness in enforcement 
may be privileged at the expense, at least to a degree, of other key principles, 
including the integrity of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.
Two years from the Brexit referendum and no clarity exists on the 
future relationship of the UK and the Union. It is hoped that in the fog 
of uncertainty the negotiating sides do not lose sight of the importance of 
effective competition enforcement across Europe and, at the same time, of the 
need to avoid straining at the seams of a legal system where the commitment 
to well-functioning markets is so important.
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